



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EFFICIENT FAULT ANALYSIS IN LINEAR ANALOG CIRCUITS

Alfred T. Johnson, Jr. Center of Engineering Widener University Chester, PA 19013

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1. The Problem of Analog Fault Analysis

Analog fault analysis is a method of finding a description (either in terms of the physical analog system or its model) of the way in which an analog system has failed. A failure (or fault) may manifest itself in many different ways, depending on the nature of the system. In the present study we consider the system to be a linear, analog electronic circuit, with at least two accessible terminals. We treat the accessible terminals as a multi-port network. The behavior of the network can be determined by measuring each of the several independent (complex) multi-port parameters (transfer functions), possibly at several frequencies. Thus, if m/2 independent, complex measurements are made, the network performance is given in terms of m real numbers, each of which is a function of the parameters of the network. We denote the measurement set by the real vector $\hat{\underline{M}} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \operatorname{col} (\hat{M}_{\hat{\mathbf{i}}})$. Similarly, we denote the corresponding set of multi-port parameters computed from the network model by the real vector $\underline{\underline{M}} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \operatorname{col} (\underline{M}_{\hat{\mathbf{i}}})$.

We will assume there are n real network parameters, each of which is either a resistance, capacitance, inductance, or controlled source gain. We denote the parameter set by the real vector $\underline{\mathbf{x}} \triangleq \text{col}(\mathbf{x_i})$.

The fault analysis problem may be stated as follows: given m real measurements and the network model containing n real parameters, find the values of the n real parameters which produce the m real measurements.

This requires solving the system of m non-linear equations in n unknowns

$$\underline{M}(\underline{x}) = \underline{\hat{M}} \tag{1}$$

Currently available analog automatic test equipment (ATE) allows the preprogramming of a sequence of test signals and measurements [1]. The software interpretation of these measurements is mostly limited to a functional test of the component or module tested. To achieve greater resolution of the fault with currently available ATE (i.e., to find the faulty component or integrated circuit in the module), requires access to more terminals (test points) and the making of a more complex sequence of measurements.

Often in practice the number of terminals available for measurement is limited. For example, in troubleshooting existing equipment, available test points are fixed by the design. In the design of new equipment, it is desirable to keep the number of test points as small as possible to avoid an excessive number of pins in the connectors.

The present study was directed at improving the reliability of high resolution (down to the component or node if necessary) analog fault analysis from measurements at the accessible terminals. The measurements in this study require applying sinusoidal sources and finding the magnitude and phase relationships of the steady state responses, i.e., the measurements are a set of complex multi-port parameters at the accessible terminals. The fault is isolated by solving (1) for the n-dimensional parameter vector $\underline{\mathbf{x}}$. Recent work in analog fault analysis has been directed toward finding an efficient way to solve these equations.

1.1 Summary of Previous Work

In solving (1), the number of network parameters may be greater than, equal to, or less than the number of measurements m. If m < n it is not possible to solve for the parameter set \underline{x} , since in this case (1) usually has infinitely many solutions. Ransom and Saeks [2]

approached this problem by finding the solution to (1) which minimizes the norm $|| \underline{x} - \underline{x}_0 ||$, where \underline{x}_0 is the nominal parameter set. The difficulty with this approach is that the solution assumes, roughly speaking, that the most likely state of the element values in the network is the one which causes the smallest drift from the nominal values consistant with the measurements. This assumption excludes the possibility of catastrophic faults (open and short circuits).

If $m \ge n$, then the non-linear equations given by (1) are often solved using optimization techniques by finding $\min_{X} || M(x) - M||$, where sometimes the norm may be reduced to zero if m = n. This approach was taken by Chen and Saeks [3], using an efficient algorithm to evaluate M(x). In order to accommodate catastrophic faults (open and short circuits) by this method, each element in the parameter space must be searched over the range $(0, \infty)$, which is not practical because of the prohibitively large number of evaluations of the function M(x).

In this project we continue to seek a way to overcome the difficulties of the two methods described above, viz. that catastrophic faults are overlooked altogether or that they are found at the cost of very lengthy computation. The approach described in this report is to modify the parameter set \underline{x} to include the set of all single short circuits involving inaccessible nodes. The remaining parameters are branch admittances or controlled source gains. Searching over short circuits eliminates the need to search over very large values of the branch admittances. It is also unnecessary to search over very large values of controlled source gains, since this mode of failure is extremely unlikely. Johnson [4], [5] has described a very efficient algorithm for evaluating the function \underline{M} (\underline{x}) in the presence of a short

circuit. The efficiency results from the fact that the network change caused by the short circuit results in an alteration of the (inaccessible) nodal admittance matrix by a matrix of unit rank. As a result, the response $\underline{M}(\underline{x})$ of the faulted network can be computed (in terms of the nominal response) using many fewer multiplications than are required for an original analysis. Sparse matrix techniques were also used to reduce computation time. The efficiency of this algorithm makes it practical to exhaustively search for a minimum of $||\underline{M}(\underline{x}) - \underline{\hat{M}}||$ over all possible single short circuits involving an inaccessible node. The test examples described by Johnson [4], [5] show that short circuits can be reliably located by the algorithm, even though measurements were made only at one frequency, and parameter drift was not taken into account.

Performing the measurements (and analysis) at more than one frequency increases the number of measurements m without changing the number of network parameters n. This may improve the reliability of the fault analysis if all the measurements are independent. The problem of independent measurements is discussed in some detail by Sen and Saeks [6] - [8], who unfortunately stop short of describing exactly how to choose the measurements and frequencies.

2. New Results in Analog Fault Analysis

The study undertaken by the author was directed toward improving the reliability of analog fault analysis (isolating short circuits, open circuits and parameter changes) while keeping the algorithm as fast and efficient as possible. Specifically two separate studies were done:

- (a) Introducing parameter changes into the current algorithm. The current algorithm searches for a minimum of $||\underline{M}(x) \underline{\hat{M}}||$ over short circuits only. By searching over the network parameters (resistances, capacitances, inductances and controlled source gains) as well, the algorithm should be improved, because of the expanded description of the fault. In addition it was hoped that the algorithm would be made more reliable (i.e., it was hoped that the algorithm would not indicate faults which were not present, but instead would find only those that were present). An efficient algorithm for calculating the network responses $\underline{\underline{M}}(\underline{x})$ in the presence of a parameter change was developed and included in the search for $\min_{\underline{X}} |\underline{\underline{M}}(\underline{x}) \underline{\hat{\underline{M}}}||$. This is described in detail in Section 2.1.
- (b) Independent Measurements. Increasing the dimension m of \underline{M} (and also of $\underline{M}(\underline{x})$) by adding independent measurements should improve the accuracy and resolution of the fault analysis. In most practical cases, the number of accessible terminals is fixed, so the only way to increase the number of measurements is to use more than one frequency. It is important to determine if the set of measurements is independent. The work on this problem is described in detail in Section 2.3.

We have discussed how the network parameters may be determined . by minimizing the norm of the difference between the measured and computed network responses $||\underline{M}(\underline{x}) - \underline{\hat{M}}||$, where \underline{M} and $\underline{\hat{M}}$ are both real vectors of dimension m. In the discussion which follows, the network responses are considered to be y-parameters at the accessible terminals, all referred to a common (accessible) node. Figure 1 shows a network with p + 1 accessible terminals

from which we define the pxp y-parameter matrix

where, as usual,

$$y_{rs} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \frac{I_{s}}{V_{r}} \bigg|_{V_{k} = 0, k \neq r}$$
 (3)

In (3) I_s and V_r are the phasor response and source, respectively. The matrix \underline{y} therefore represents p^2 complex




Figure 1 - p-Port Network with p+1 accessible terminals.

parameters or $2p^2$ real parameters. These $2p^2$ real parameters form the vector \underline{M} of dimension m, i.e., $m \triangleq \dim \underline{M} = 2p^2$, an even integer. (The exact order in which the elements of vector \underline{M} are formed from the elements of matrix \underline{y} is not important. However, the measured response vector $\underline{\hat{M}}$ is formed

from the measured y-parameter matrix \hat{y} by the same rule used to form one computed response vector \underline{M} from the computed y-parameter matrix y).

We close this section by displaying a formula derived by Johnson [4], [5], which will be used in subsequent sections.

Johnson shows that the pxp matrix of measurable y-parameters defined above is given by

$$\underline{y} = \underline{A}_1 \underline{Y}_b \left[\underline{1} - \underline{A}_2^T \left(\underline{A}_2 \underline{Y}_b \underline{A}_2^T\right)^{-1} \underline{A}_2 \underline{Y}_b\right] \underline{A}^T \tag{4}$$

where

$$\underline{A} = \left[\frac{\underline{A}_1}{\underline{A}_2} \right]$$

is the node-to-branch incidence matrix (as defined by and Kuh [9] partitioned into the accessible (\underline{A}_1) and the inaccessible (\underline{A}_2) nodes, and \underline{Y}_b is the branch admittance matrix [4], [5], [10]. If the network contains b branches, \underline{Y}_b is a sparse bxb matrix whose elements are simple functions of the branch admittances and the controlled source gains. It therefore plays the role of the parameter vector \underline{x} and can be expressed in terms of x.

2.1 Parameter Changes

In order to find $\min_{\underline{Y}_b} ||\underline{y}(\underline{Y}_b) - \underline{\hat{y}}||$ it is important to compute $\underline{\underline{Y}_b}$ efficiently. Such an algorithm has been found if a change is made in only one parameter at a time. To derive this result, suppose \underline{Y}_b is changed by the bxb matrix \underline{A} . Then from (4) the y-parameter matrix becomes

$$\underline{\mathbf{Y}}' = \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{1} \left(\underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} + \underline{\mathbf{A}} \right) \left[\underline{\mathbf{1}} - \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \left(\underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2} (\underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} + \underline{\mathbf{A}}) \ \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \right)^{-1} \ \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2} (\underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} + \underline{\mathbf{A}}) \right] \underline{\mathbf{A}}^{\mathsf{T}}$$
 (5)

The major computational difficulty in evaluating the right side of (5) is computing the inverse of the new inaccessible nodal admittance matrix $\underline{Y}_2^1 = \underline{A}_2 \ (\underline{Y}_b + \underline{\Delta}) \ \underline{A}_2^T$. Define the qxq matrix $\underline{Y}_2 \ \underline{\Delta} \ \underline{A}_2 \underline{Y}_b \underline{A}_2^T$, where q is the number of inacessible nodes. Thus $\underline{Y}_2^1 = \underline{Y}_2 + \underline{A}_2 \underline{\Delta} \ \underline{A}_2^T$ and we wish to find the inverse of \underline{Y}_2^1 .

During this investigation we have discovered that if only one network parameter is changed, $\underline{\Delta}$ can be formed as the outer product of two vectors $\underline{u} \triangleq \operatorname{col}(u_1)$ and $\underline{v} \triangleq \operatorname{col}(v_1)$, i.e. $\underline{\Delta} = \underline{u}\underline{v}^T$. (In this case $\underline{\Delta}$ has unit rank). The specific way in which \underline{u} and \underline{v} are formed depend on whether the network parameter changed is a passive admittance or a controlled source. The several special cases are discussed in Sections 2.1.1 through 2.1.5, which the reader may skip without loss of continuity.

The product $\underline{A_2}\underline{\wedge}$ $\underline{A_2}^T$ may therefore be expressed as the outer product \underline{UV}^T , where $\underline{U} \triangleq \underline{A_2}\underline{u}$ and $\underline{V} \triangleq \underline{A_2}\underline{v}$ are both vectors of dimension q, where q is the number of inaccessible nodes. We may now write

$$\underline{Y}_2^i = \underline{Y}_2 + \underline{U}\underline{V}^\mathsf{T}. \tag{6}$$

Householder [11] shows that the inverse of \underline{Y}_2^1 can be formed from

$$\underline{Y_{2}^{-1}} = \underline{Y_{2}^{-1}} \left[\underline{1} - \underline{U} (1 + \underline{V}^{T} \underline{Y_{2}^{-1}} \underline{U})^{-1} \underline{V}^{T} \underline{Y_{2}^{-1}} \right]$$
 (7)

In (7) the inverse of \underline{Y}_2 is known from an initial computation (in terms of the nominal parameter values) which is performed only once, and $1 + \underline{Y}^T \underline{Y}_2^{-1} \underline{U}$ is a scaler. Thus the right side of (7) may be found without a matrix inversion.

The Fortran code for computing \underline{Y}_2^{-1} using (7) has been written and may be found in Appendix 1 (SUBROUTINE Y2PI2). Sparse matrix techniques have been used to store the vectors \underline{U} and \underline{V} .

The purpose of the next several sections (2.1.1 through 2.1.5 is to show that a change in any network parameter changes the branch admittance \underline{Y}_b by a matrix of unit rank, i.e., $\underline{Y}_b^* = \underline{Y}_b + \underline{\Delta}$, where $\underline{\Delta} = \underline{u} \, \underline{v}^T$, and $\underline{u} \, \underline{\Delta} \, \text{col} \, (u_i)$, $\underline{v} \, \underline{\Delta} \, \text{col} \, (v_i)$. An efficient computer program for forming the vectors \underline{u} and \underline{v} using sparse matrix techniques has been written, and the listing may be found in Appendix 1 (SUBROUTINE UVVEC).

Johnson and Pennington [10] have shown that in a network containing b branches, the bxb branch admittance matrix can be formed from the element matrices as follows:

$$\underline{Y}_{b} = (\underline{1} + \underline{Y} \underline{R}_{m} - \underline{\alpha})^{-1} (\underline{Y} - \underline{Y} \underline{M} + \underline{G}_{m})$$
 (8)

where \underline{l} is the bxb identity matrix, \underline{Y} is the bxb matrix diag (Y_i) and Y_i is the self-admittance of branch i; \underline{R}_m is the bxb matrix $\{R_{ij}\}$, where R_{ij} is the transistance in branch j controlled by the current in branch i; $\underline{\alpha}$, $\underline{\mu}$, and \underline{G}_m are defined similarly and contain branch coupling in the form of current gains, voltage gains, and transconductances respectively.

2.1.1 Parameter Change is a Passive Admittance[†]

If a change is made in branch admittance k, then \underline{Y} becomes $\underline{Y} + \underline{\Delta}$, where $\underline{\Delta}$ is zero except for element k. A little algebra shows that \underline{Y}_b has been changed to $\underline{Y}_b^* = \underline{Y}_b + \underline{\Delta}$, where

⁺The reader may omit this section without loss of continuity.

$$\underline{\Delta} = \underline{W} (\Delta \underline{X}) - (\Delta \underline{M}) \underline{X} - (\Delta \underline{M}) (\Delta \underline{X}) \tag{9}$$

and $\underline{X} = \underline{Y} - \underline{Y} \underline{\mu} + \underline{G}_{m}$ $\underline{W} = \underline{1} - \underline{Y} \underline{R}_{m} + \underline{\alpha}$ $\underline{\Delta X} = \underline{\Delta_{y}} - \underline{\Delta_{y}} \underline{\mu}$ $\underline{\Delta M} = -\underline{\Delta_{y}} \underline{R}_{m}$

Equation (9) simplifies since $(\Delta \underline{W})$ $(\Delta \underline{X}) = \underline{o}$, which may be shown as follows. After some algebra, using (9),

$$(\underline{\Delta W}) (\underline{\Delta X}) = (\underline{\Delta_{V}} \underline{R_{m}} \underline{\Delta_{V}}) (\underline{u} - \underline{1}),$$

which is zero if $\underline{\Delta}_y$ \underline{R}_m $\underline{\Delta}_y$ = $\underline{0}$. Suppose branch admittance k is changed, and define $\underline{B} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \underline{R}_m$ $\underline{\Delta}_y$. Therefore $\underline{B}_{ij} = \sum\limits_{m} (R_m)_{im} (\Delta_y)_{mj}$. But all elements of $\underline{\Delta}_y$ are zero except for element (k,k).

$$B_{ij} = 0 , j \neq k$$

$$B_{ik} = (R_m)_{ik} (\Delta_y)_{kk} , v i$$
(10)

Now $\Delta_y R_m \Delta_y = \Delta_y B$. Consider the elements of column k of this matrix:

$$\left(\underline{\Delta}_{y} \, \underline{R}_{m} \, \underline{\Delta}_{y}\right)_{rk} = \sum_{i} \left(\underline{\Delta}_{y}\right)_{ri} \, \underline{B}_{ik} \tag{11}$$

From (10) we see that $\underline{\Delta}_y \ \underline{R}_m \ \underline{\Delta}_y$ is zero except for elements in column k. Furthermore the summation need be carried out over element i = r only, since $(\underline{\Delta}_y)_{ri} = 0$, $r \neq i$. Finally, $(\underline{\Delta}_y)_{rr} = 0$ unless r = k, so $\underline{\Delta}_y \ \underline{R}_m \ \underline{\Delta}_y$ contains only one non-zero element, namely $(\underline{\Delta}_y \ \underline{R}_m \ \underline{\Delta}_y)_{kk} = (\underline{\Delta}_y)_{kk} (R_m)_{kk} (\underline{\Delta}_y)_{kk}$. But this last expression is zero because branch k never contains a transresistance controlled by branch k. (This is modelled instead as a simple self admittance). QED.

After deleting the last term in (9), the change in the branch admittance matrix \underline{Y} due to a change in branch admittance k becomes

$$\underline{\Delta} = \underline{\Delta}_{y} - \underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{\mu} + \hat{\underline{\alpha}} \underline{\Delta}_{y} - \hat{\underline{\alpha}} \underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{\mu} + \underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{R}_{m} \hat{\underline{G}}_{m}$$

$$+ \underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{R}_{m} \underline{Y} + \underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{R}_{m} \hat{\underline{G}}_{m}$$
(12)

where $\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \triangleq \underline{\alpha} - \underline{Y} \; \underline{R}_m$ is the Norton equivalent current coupling matrix and $\hat{\underline{G}}_m \triangleq \underline{G}_m - \underline{Y} \; \underline{\nu}$ is the Norton equivalent transconductance matrix (see Johnson and Pennington [10]). We will now show that all terms on the right side of (12) contribute elements only to one row or column (except the term $\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \triangleq \underline{\Delta}_y$, q.v.), if only one network parameter is changed. As a result, $\underline{\Delta}$ may be written $\underline{\nu} \; \underline{\nu}^T$, as explained in Section 2.1.

1. $\underline{\Lambda}_{y}$ places a term in element (k,k) of $\underline{\Lambda}$.

2.
$$(\underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{\mu})_{ij} = \sum_{m} (\Delta_{y})_{im} \underline{\mu}_{mj}$$

$$= (\Delta_{y})_{ii} \underline{\mu}_{ij}$$

$$= 0, i \neq k$$

Therefore $\underline{\Lambda}_y \underline{\mu}$ places elements only in row k of $\underline{\Lambda}$.

3.
$$(\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \Delta_y)_{ij} = \sum_{m} \hat{\alpha}_{im} (\Delta_y)_{mj}$$

$$= \hat{\alpha}_{ij} (\Delta_y)_{jj}$$

$$= 0, j \neq k$$

Therefore $\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \ \underline{\Lambda}_y$ places elements in column k of $\underline{\Lambda}$, if branch k contains current controlled sources.

4.
$$(\underline{\alpha} \underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{\mu})_{ij} = \sum_{m} \hat{\alpha}_{im} (\underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{\mu})_{mj}$$

$$= \hat{\alpha}_{iK} (\underline{\Delta}_{y} \underline{\mu})_{Kj}$$

$$= \hat{\alpha}_{iK} (\underline{\Delta}_{y})_{KK} \underline{\mu}_{Kj}$$

If such a term were present, the network model would contain a controlled source in branch i $(\hat{\alpha}_{ik})$ which was controlled by the branch current of a branch containing a controlled source (branch k contains source μ_{kj}). Such a condition is not allowed in the model [10], so $\underline{\alpha} \, \underline{\Delta}_{v} \, \underline{\mu} = \underline{0}$.

The final two terms in (12) contain the product $\underline{\Delta}_y \xrightarrow{R_m}$. Element (i, j)of this matrix is

$$(\underline{\Delta}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m})_{ij} = \sum_{m} (\Delta_{y})_{im} (R_{m})_{mj}$$

$$= (\Delta_{y})_{ii} (R_{m})_{ij} = 0 , i \neq k$$

$$(\underline{\Delta}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m})_{ki} = (\Delta_{y})_{kk} (R_{m})_{kj} , i = k$$

We now consider the final two terms in (12).

5.
$$(\underline{\Delta}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m} \ \underline{Y})_{ij} = \sum_{m} (\underline{\Delta}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m})_{im} \ Y_{mj}$$

$$= (\underline{\Delta}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m})_{ij} \ Y_{jj} = 0 , i \neq k$$

$$(\underline{\Delta}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m} \ \underline{Y})_{kj} = (\underline{\Delta}_{y})_{kk} \ (\underline{R}_{m})_{kj} \ Y_{ij}$$

$$\forall j$$

Therefore $\underline{\Lambda}_{y} \ \underline{R}_{m} \ \underline{Y}$ contributes terms along row k of $\underline{\Lambda}$.

6.
$$(\underline{\Delta}_{\mathbf{y}} \ \underline{R}_{\mathbf{m}} \ \hat{\underline{G}}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{i}\mathbf{j}} = \sum_{\mathbf{m}} (\underline{\Delta}_{\mathbf{y}} \ \underline{R}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{i}\mathbf{m}} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{m}\mathbf{j}} = 0 , \mathbf{i} \neq k$$

$$(\underline{\Delta}_{\mathbf{y}} \ \underline{R}_{\mathbf{m}} \ \hat{\underline{G}}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{j}} = \sum_{\mathbf{m}} (\underline{\Delta}_{\mathbf{y}} \ \underline{R}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{k}\mathbf{m}} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{m}\mathbf{j}}$$

$$= \sum_{\mathbf{m}} (\underline{\Delta}_{\mathbf{y}})_{\mathbf{k}\mathbf{k}} (R_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{k}\mathbf{m}} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{m}\mathbf{j}}$$

$$= (\underline{\Delta}_{\mathbf{y}})_{\mathbf{k}\mathbf{k}} \sum_{\mathbf{m}} (R_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{k}\mathbf{m}} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{\mathbf{m}})_{\mathbf{m}\mathbf{j}} \qquad \forall \mathbf{j}$$

Therefore $\underline{\Delta}_y \xrightarrow{R_m} \hat{\underline{G}}_m$ contributes terms along row k of $\underline{\Delta}$, although few, if any, such terms are likely to exist since the presence of this term requires that the network contain

a transresistance controlled by the current in a branch containing a voltage controlled source.

2.1.2 Parameter Change is a Transresistance

If a change is made in transresistance $(R_m)_{ij}$, then \underline{R}_m becomes $\underline{R}_m + \underline{\Delta}_r$, where $\underline{\Delta}_r$ is zero except for element $(\Delta_r)_{ij}$. Replacing \underline{R}_m by $\underline{R}_m + \underline{\Delta}_r$ in (8) and performing some algebraic reduction, \underline{Y}_b becomes $\underline{Y}_b + \underline{\Delta}$ where

$$\underline{\Lambda} = -\underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_{r} \underline{Y} - \underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_{r} \underline{\hat{G}}_{r}$$
(13)

Both terms in (13) contain the product $\underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_r$. Expanding element (r, s) of $\underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_r$.

$$\frac{(\underline{Y} \Delta_r)_{rs}}{(\underline{Y} \Delta_r)_{ij}} = \sum_{m}^{r} Y_{rm} (\Delta_r)_{ms}$$

$$= Y_{rr} (\Delta_r)_{rs} = 0 \text{ if } r \neq i, s \neq j$$

$$(\underline{Y} \Delta_r)_{ij} = Y_{ii} (\Delta_r)_{ij}$$

Therefore $\underline{Y} \xrightarrow{\Delta}_{\Gamma}$ has only one non-zero element (i, j). We now expand element (r, s) of both terms of (13).

⁺ The reader may skip this section without loss of continuity.

Therefore $\underline{Y} \underline{\Delta}_r \underline{Y}$ contains a single non-zero element (i, j).

2.
$$(\underline{Y} \underline{\Delta}_{r} \hat{\underline{G}}_{m})_{rs} = \sum_{m} (\underline{Y} \underline{\Delta}_{r})_{rm} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{m})_{ms}$$

$$= 0 , r \neq i, m \neq j$$

$$(\underline{Y} \underline{\Delta}_{r} \hat{\underline{G}}_{m})_{is} = (\underline{Y} \underline{\Delta}_{r})_{ij} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{m})_{js}$$

$$= Y_{ii} (\underline{\Delta}_{r})_{ii} (\hat{\underline{G}}_{m})_{is} , \forall s$$

Therefore $\underline{Y} \underline{\Delta}_{\underline{r}} \underline{G}_{\underline{m}}$ places terms in row i of $\underline{\Delta}$.

2.1.3 Parameter Change is a Current Gain

If a change is made in current gain α_{ij} , then $\underline{\alpha}$ is changed to $\underline{\alpha} + \underline{\Lambda}_{\underline{\alpha}}$, where $\underline{\Lambda}_{\underline{\alpha}}$ is zero except for element $(\underline{\Lambda}_{\underline{\alpha}})_{ij}$. Replacing $\underline{\alpha}$ by $\underline{\alpha} + \underline{\Lambda}_{\underline{\alpha}}$ in (8), after some algebraic reduction $\underline{Y}_{\underline{b}}$ becomes $\underline{Y}_{\underline{b}} + \underline{\Lambda}$, where

$$\underline{\Delta} = -\underline{\Delta}_{\alpha} \underline{Y} - \underline{\Delta}_{\alpha} \underline{\hat{G}}_{m} \tag{14}$$

We now expand element (r, s) of both terms of (14).

1.
$$(\underline{\Delta}_{\alpha} \underline{Y})_{rs} = \sum_{m} (\Delta_{\alpha})_{rm} Y_{ms}$$

$$= (\Delta_{\alpha})_{rs} Y_{ss} = 0, r \neq i, s \neq j$$

$$(\underline{\Delta}_{\alpha} \underline{Y})_{ij} = (\Delta_{\alpha})_{ij} Y_{jj}$$

Therefore $\underline{\Lambda}_{\alpha}$ \underline{Y} contains a single non-zero element (i, j) .

2.
$$(\underline{\Delta}_{\alpha} \ \underline{\hat{G}}_{m})_{rs} = \sum_{m} (\Delta_{\alpha})_{rm} (\hat{G}_{m})_{ms}$$

$$= 0 , r \neq i, m \neq j$$

$$(\underline{\Delta}_{\alpha} \ \underline{G}_{m})_{is} = (\Delta_{\alpha})_{ij} (\hat{G}_{m})_{js} , \forall s$$

Therefore $\underline{\Lambda}_{\alpha}$ \underline{G}_{m} contributes elements in row i of $\underline{\Lambda}$.

⁺ The reader may skip this section without loss of continuity.

2.1.4 Parameter Change is a Voltage Gain+

If a change is made in voltage gain μ_{ij} , then $\underline{\mu}$ is changed to $\underline{\mu} + \underline{\Delta}_{\mu}$, where $\underline{\Delta}_{\mu}$ is zero except for element $(\underline{\Delta}_{\mu})_{ij}$. Replacing $\underline{\mu}$ by $\underline{\mu} + \underline{\Delta}_{\mu}$ in (8), after some algebraic reduction \underline{Y}_b becomes $\underline{Y}_b + \underline{\Delta}$, where

$$\underline{\Delta} = -\underline{Y}\underline{\Delta}_{\mu} - \hat{\underline{\alpha}}\underline{Y}\underline{\Delta}_{\mu} \tag{15}$$

We now expand element (r, s) of both terms of (15).

Therefore $\underline{Y} \ \underline{\Delta}_{\mu}$ contributes only one term to $\underline{\Delta}$.

2.
$$(\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_{\mu})_{rs} = \sum_{m} \hat{\alpha}_{rm} (\underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_{\mu})_{ms}$$

$$= 0 , m \neq i , s \neq j$$

$$(\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_{\mu})_{rj} = \hat{\alpha}_{ri} (\underline{Y} \underline{\Lambda}_{\mu})_{ij}$$

$$= \hat{\alpha}_{ri} Y_{ij} (\underline{\Lambda}_{\mu})_{ij} , V r$$

Therefore $\hat{\underline{\alpha}}~\underline{Y}~\underline{\Lambda}_{\mu}$ contributes terms down columnj of $\underline{\Lambda}$.

2.1.5 Parameter Change is a Transconductancet

If a change is made in transconductance $(G_m)_{ij}$ then \underline{G}_m is changed to $\underline{G}_m + \underline{\Delta}_g$, where $\underline{\Delta}_g$ is zero except for element $(\underline{\Delta}_g)_{ij}$.

⁺ The reader may skip this section without loss of continuity.

Replacing \underline{G}_m by $\underline{G}_m+\underline{\Delta}_g$ in (8), after some algebraic reduction \underline{Y}_b becomes $\underline{Y}_b+\underline{\Delta}$, where

$$\underline{\Lambda} = \underline{\Lambda}_{g} + \hat{\underline{\alpha}} \, \underline{\Lambda}_{g} \tag{16}$$

We now discuss both terms in (16).

- 1. $\underline{\Lambda}_g$ contributes only one term, $(\underline{\Lambda}_g)_{ij}$, to $\underline{\Lambda}$.
- 2. $(\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \ \underline{\Delta}_{g})_{rs} = \sum_{m} \hat{\alpha}_{rm} (\Delta_{g})_{ms} = 0, m \neq i, s \neq j$ $(\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \ \underline{\Delta}_{g})_{rj} = \hat{\alpha}_{ri} (\Delta_{g})_{ij}, \forall r$

Therefore $\hat{\underline{\alpha}} \ \underline{\Delta}_g$ contribute terms down column j of $\underline{\Delta}$.

2.2 Finding Independent Measurements

In Section 1 we discussed the problem of solving the nonlinear equation $\underline{M}(\underline{x}) = \underline{\hat{M}}$, in which \underline{x} is the unknown parameter vector of dimension n, $\underline{\underline{M}}$ is the vector of m network responses measured at the accessible terminals, and M(x) is the vector of m network responses calculated from the network model. The three cases (m<n, m=n, m>n) must be considered separately. Ransom and Saeks [2] have discussed the underdetermined case (m<n), which is not very practical because the fault cannot be resolved satisfactorily in this case. The second and third cases (m≥n) can be solved by finding the parameter vector x which minimizes the norm $||\underline{M}(\underline{x}) - \underline{\tilde{M}}||$. (This approach has the advantage of taking measurement error into account in a sensible way in the overdetermined case, m>n). In Section 2, we discussed the solution to this optimization problem by means of a search over the parameter set x. An alternative approach, which provides some insight into the question of independent measurements, is to expand M(x) in a Taylor series about the nominal parameter set \underline{x}_0 . If we truncate the Taylor series after the linear terms, we obtain the approximation

$$\underline{M}(\underline{x}) \simeq \underline{M}(\underline{x}_0) + \underline{F}(\underline{x}_0)(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_0) \tag{16}$$

where F(x) is the Jacobian Matrix defined by

$$\left\{\underline{F}(\underline{x})\right\} \begin{array}{l} \overset{\Delta}{ij} & \frac{\partial \{\underline{M}(\underline{x})\}_{i}}{\partial x_{j}} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} i=1,2,\ldots,m\\ j=1,2,\ldots,n \end{array} \right\} \end{array}$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1,2,\ldots,m\\ j=1,2,\ldots,n \end{array} \right\}$$

From (16) the linearized form of the equation $\underline{M}(\underline{x}) = \underline{\hat{M}}$ is determined to be $\underline{F}(\underline{x}_0)(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_0) = \underline{\hat{M}} - \underline{M}(\underline{x}_0)$, in which, as before, dim $(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_0) = n$ and dim $(\underline{\hat{M}} - \underline{M}) = m$. Since we are treating the overdetermined case m>n,

we proceed by minimizing $||\underline{F}_{o}(\underline{x}-\underline{x}_{o}) - (\underline{\hat{M}}-\underline{M}_{o})||$, where $\underline{F}_{o} \triangleq \underline{F}(\underline{x}_{o})$ and $\underline{M}_{o} \triangleq \underline{M}(\underline{x}_{o})$. The minimization of the norm is accomplished by first defining the scalar function

$$\phi(\underline{x}) \triangleq \left| \left| \underline{F}_{o}(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o}) - (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o}) \right| \right|^{2}$$

$$= \left[\underline{F}_{o}(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o}) - (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o}) \right]^{T} \left[\underline{F}_{o}(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o}) - (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o}) \right]$$

$$= (\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o})^{T} \underline{F}_{o}^{T} \underline{F}_{o} (\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o})$$

$$-2(\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o})^{T} \underline{F}_{o} (\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o})$$

$$+ (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o})^{T} (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o})$$

$$(18)$$

and then taking the differential of $\phi(x)$:

$$d\phi = 2[(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_{o})^{\mathsf{T}} \underline{F}_{o}^{\mathsf{T}} \underline{F}_{o} - (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_{o})^{\mathsf{T}} \underline{F}_{o}] d\underline{x}$$

$$+ d\underline{x}^{\mathsf{T}} \underline{F}_{o}^{\mathsf{T}} \underline{F}_{o} d\underline{x}$$
(19)

At a minimum of $\phi(\underline{x})$, $d\phi$ may not change sign when $d\underline{x}$ changes sign. Therefore a necessary condition for a minimum of $\phi(\underline{x})$ is

$$(\underline{x} - \underline{x}_0)^T \underline{F}_0^T \underline{F}_0 - (\underline{M} - \underline{M}_0)^T \underline{F}_0 = \underline{0}$$

or

$$\underline{F}_{O}^{\mathsf{T}}\underline{F}_{O} \left(\underline{x}-\underline{x}_{O}\right) = \underline{F}_{O}^{\mathsf{T}} \left(\underline{\mathsf{M}}-\underline{\mathsf{M}}_{O}\right) . \tag{20}$$

The deviation $\underline{x}-\underline{x}_0$ of the element values from their nominal value may be found from (20) if the nxn matrix $\underline{F}_0^T\underline{F}$ is non-singular, which requires in this case that rank $(\underline{F}) = n.$

We do not necessarily recommend using (20) to determine the parameter set x of the faulted network, although this may be the most efficient approach. See Section 3 for a discussion of computational complexity.

Since $m \ge n$, the mxn Jacobian matrix \underline{F} has at least as many rows as columns, and the maximum rank of \underline{F} is n. The rank of \underline{F} is less than n if any column of \underline{F} is a linear combination of the remaining columns. The simplest case is that a column is a constant multiple of another column. Suppose, for example, (col i) = a (col j), i.e.

$$\frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x_i} = a \frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x_j} \quad (k = 1, 2, ..., m)$$
 (21)

One obvious way this can occur is if parameters x_i and x_j are two like elements in series or parallel. Suppose that x_i and x_j are the conductances of two resistors in parallel, so that $y \stackrel{\Delta}{=} x_i + x_j$ is the combined conductance. All transfer functions which do not access separately the inputs or outputs of x_i and x_j may be written $M_k(y,\underline{z})$, where \underline{z} is the vector of all network parameters except x_i and x_j . Now the partial derivatives of M_k with respect to x_i and x_j are

$$\frac{\partial M_{K}}{\partial x_{i}} = \frac{\partial M_{K}}{\partial y} \cdot \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_{i}} = \frac{\partial M_{K}}{\partial y}$$
 (22)

$$\frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial M_k}{\partial y} \cdot \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial M_k}{\partial y}$$
 (23)

Thus (21) applies with a=1, as asserted. This result, that no distinction can be made between imbedded like element kinds in series or parallel, is intuitively reasonable.

A less obvious example of column dependency is illustrated by the simplified cascaded amplifier circuit shown in Figure 2. Define the transfer functions and network parameters

$$M_1 = z_{11} = R_1$$
 $x_1 = R_1$ $x_2 = R_2$ $x_3 = R_3$ $x_4 = g_{m1}$ $x_5 = g_{m2}$




Figure 2 - Simplified Cascaded Amplifier

The transimpedance z_{12} is not used in this example because its value is zero. The Jacobian matrix $\left\{\partial M_i/\partial x_j\right\}$ is

$$\underline{\mathbf{F}} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{g}_{m1} \mathbf{g}_{m2} \mathbf{R}_{2} \mathbf{R}_{3} & \mathbf{g}_{m1} \mathbf{g}_{m2} \mathbf{R}_{1} \mathbf{R}_{3} & \mathbf{g}_{m1} \mathbf{g}_{m2} \mathbf{R}_{1} \mathbf{R}_{2} & \mathbf{g}_{m2} \mathbf{R}_{1} \mathbf{R}_{2} \mathbf{R}_{3} & \mathbf{g}_{m1} \mathbf{R}_{1} \mathbf{R}_{2} \mathbf{R}_{3} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}$$

If g_{m1} and g_{m2} are equal, then columns 4 and 5 are identical. This doesn't reduce the rank of \underline{F} in this case (the rank of \underline{F} is 3), but it could in practical cases where \underline{F} has more rows than columns (m>n).

Continuing with the problem of column dependency, suppose x_i is the conductance of a resistor in parallel with a capacitor of capacitance x_j , and $x = x_i + j\omega x_j$ is the combined admittance. All transfer functions which do not access separately the inputs or outputs of parameters x_i and x_j may be written $M_K(x,\underline{z})$, where \underline{z} is the vector of all network parameters except x_i and x_j . The partial

derivatives of M_K with respect to x_i and x_j are

$$\frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x} \cdot \frac{\partial x}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial M_K}{\partial x}$$
 (24)

$$\frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x} = \frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x} \cdot \frac{\partial x}{\partial x_j} = j\omega \frac{\partial M_k}{\partial x}$$
 (25)

Thus (21) applies with $a=j\omega$. Columns i and j of F are dependent, so rank F < n and the nxn matrix F^TF cannot be inverted, since rank F^TF < n, if $m\ge n$. As a consequence, (20) cannot be solved for the new parameter vector. We have discovered the surprising result that the identification problem cannot be perfectly resolved if the number of measurements is at least as great as the number of parameters and the network contains imbedded elements in parallel (or in series). That rank (F) < n in this case will be illustrated now by an example.

In this example it is necessary that $m \ge n$, and we have chosen the simple 2-port network illustrated in Figure 3 in which m = n = 3.




Figure 3 - Two-port Network.

We choose the three transfer functions and parameters

$$M_{1} = y_{11} = \frac{1}{j\omega L} + j\omega C + G$$

$$M_{2} = y_{21} = j\omega C + G$$

$$M_{3} = y_{22} = j\omega C + G$$

$$x_{3} = G$$
The Jacobian matrix $\left\{\frac{\partial M_{i}}{\partial K_{j}}\right\}$ is
$$\frac{1}{j\omega L^{2}} \qquad j\omega \qquad 1$$

$$E = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & j\omega & 1 \\ 0 & j\omega & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

as asserted, columns 2 and 3 of \underline{F} are dependent. Since rank \underline{F} = 2, the fault analysis problem cannot be fully resolved for this problem.

In some cases the column dependency can be removed by increasing the number of measurements by using another frequency. In this example if M_1 , M_2 and M_3 are defined as before at frequency $\omega=\omega_1$ and M_4 , M_5 and M_6 are the same transfer functions at frequency $\omega=\omega_2$, the Jacobian matrix is

$$\frac{F}{\int_{0}^{1} \frac{1}{j\omega_{1}L^{2}}} \int_{0}^{1} \omega_{1} = 1$$

$$\frac{0}{\int_{0}^{1} \frac{1}{j\omega_{1}L^{2}}} \int_{0}^{1} \omega_{1} = 1$$

$$\frac{1}{\int_{0}^{1} \frac{1}{j\omega_{2}L^{2}}} \int_{0}^{1} \omega_{2} = 1$$

$$\frac{1}{\int_{0}^{1} \frac{1}{j\omega_{2}L^{2}}} \int_{0}^{1} \omega_{2} = 1$$

$$\frac{1}{\int_{0}^{1} \frac{1}{j\omega_{2}L^{2}}} \int_{0}^{1} \omega_{2} = 1$$

and rank (F) = 3.

Another way to handle the problem is to split the transfer functions into their real and imaginary parts. Continuing the example, define the transfer functions and parameters

$$M_1 \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Re(y_{11}) = G$$
 $x_1 = L$
 $M_2 \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Im(y_{11}) = \omega C - \frac{1}{\omega L}$ $x_2 = C$
 $M_3 \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Re(y_{21}) = G$ $x_3 = G$
 $M_4 \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Im(y_{21}) = \omega C$

Now m = 4, n = 3, and the Jacobian matrix is

$$\mathbf{F} = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 1 \\
\frac{1}{\omega L^2} & \omega & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & \omega & 0
\end{bmatrix}$$

and again rank (\underline{F}) = 3. Since M_1 and M_3 are identical, rows 1 and 3 of \underline{F} are the same. This doesn't reduce the rank of \underline{F} , but it is clear that M_3 may be discarded without reducing the information of the measurements.

From the discussion above we conclude that the measurements should be split into their real and imaginary parts, and more than one frequency should be used, if necessary, to make the number of measurements at least as great as the number of network parameters $(m\geq n)$.

In practical examples a considerable amount of computation is needed to find the functional form of the elements of the Jacobian matrix. Sen and Saeks use such functional forms in their discussion of the problem of independent measurements [6] - [8], but admit that no theory yet exists for choosing measurements while taking numerical

considerations into account.

In view of the discussion above, it appears that the most practical approach to the problem of identifying a sufficient number of independent measurements ($m\ge n$) is to examine the numerical conditioning of the nxn matrix $\underline{F}^T\underline{F}$, evaluated from the nominal network parameters. An algorithm for evaluating cond $(\underline{F}^TF)^{\dagger}$ is given by Forsythe and Moler [12].

Establishing a useful set of independent measurements requires searching for min cond $(\underline{F}^T\underline{F})$ over various sets of trial measurements and frequencies. This time consuming search seems most suitable to a "simulation before test" process; i.e., the best set of measurements is established from the circuit model before testing the faulty circuit. The contract period was not sufficiently long to permit trying this procedure, but a working algorithm is in preparation.

2.2.1 Computing the Jacobian Matrix

The Jacobian matrix is defined by $\underline{F} \triangleq [\partial M_i(\underline{x})/\partial x_j]$. We have taken the network responses $\underline{M}(\underline{x})$ to be the real and imaginary parts of the y-parameters at the accessible terminals, where, from (4),

$$\underline{\mathbf{y}} = \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{1} \underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{1}^{\mathsf{T}} - \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{1} \underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \left(\underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2} \underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \right)^{-1} \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{2} \underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} \underline{\mathbf{A}}_{1}^{\mathsf{T}}$$

$$\underline{\mathbf{Y}}_{b} = \left(\underline{1} - \underline{\mathbf{Y}} \ \underline{\mathbf{R}}_{m} + \underline{\alpha} \right) \left(\underline{\mathbf{Y}} - \underline{\mathbf{Y}} \ \underline{\mathbf{M}} + \underline{\mathbf{G}}_{m} \right)$$

$$(26)$$

[†] If \underline{A} is a square matrix, cond (\underline{A}) is defined to be the ratio of the largest to smallest eigenvalue in absolute value. Therefore cond $(\underline{A}) \geq 1$, and large values for cond (\underline{A}) indicate nearly singular matrices for which the numerical evaluation of \underline{A}^{-1} may be meaningless.

and so we want to compute $\partial y/\partial x_i$. Making use of the identity

$$\frac{\partial B^{-1}}{\partial x} = -\underline{B}^{-1} \frac{\partial B}{\partial x} B^{-1}$$

and after much algebraic simplification, we find that

$$\frac{\partial \underline{Y}}{\partial x_{i}} = \underline{A}_{1} \left\{ \left[\underline{1} - \underline{Y}_{b} \underline{A}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \left(\underline{A}_{2} \underline{Y}_{b} \underline{A}^{\mathsf{T}} \right)^{-1} \underline{A}_{2} \right] \frac{\partial \underline{Y}_{b}}{\partial x_{i}} \left[\underline{1} - \underline{A}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \left(\underline{A}_{2} \underline{Y}_{b} \underline{A}_{2}^{\mathsf{T}} \right)^{-1} \underline{A}_{2} \underline{Y}_{b} \right] \right\} \underline{A}_{1}^{\mathsf{T}}$$

$$(27)$$

In (27) the second term in square brackets,

 $\begin{array}{l} [\underline{1}-\underline{A_2^T}~(\underline{A_2Y_bA_2^T})^{-1}~\underline{A_2Y_b}]~,~is~available~from~the~nominal~\\ analysis.+~The~first~term~in~square~brackets, \end{array}$

 $[1-Y_bA_2^T(A_2Y_bA^T)^{-1}A_2]$, is very similar to the second term in square brackets. In fact, if the network model contained no controlled sources, Y_b would be symmetrical, and these two terms would be the transpose of one another. The right side of (27) could be computed very efficiently in this case, especially since $\frac{\partial Y_b}{\partial x_i}$ is very sparse. Unfortunately we cannot take advantage of this simplification, because the circuits of greatest concern contain controlled sources.

An algorithm for computing the right side of (27) as efficiently as possible, taking advantage of the sparseness of $\partial \underline{Y}_b/\partial x_i$, has been written. The reader is referred to the listing of subroutine JACCOL in Appendix 1.

The term appears in equation (4) and is computed as the array D(·,·) in subroutine YMAT. The listing may be found in Appendix 1.

Computational Complexity

The algorithm described in Section 2.1 makes use of a formula of Householder [11], which eliminates the need to invert the inaccessible nodal admittance matrix \underline{Y}' to calculate the accessible transfer functions \underline{y} each time a parameter is changed. In this section we compare the amount of computation required to complete the search for $\min_{\underline{X}} ||\underline{M}(\underline{x})-\underline{M}||$ using this efficient algorithm to the amount of computation which would be required if \underline{Y}' were directly inverted at each step of the search.

The computational complexity will be described in terms of the number of complex multiplications performed by the algorithm. This depends on the network configuration and specifically on the number of accessible nodes, inaccessible nodes, branches, controlled sources, etc. The computational complexity of the efficient algorithm is even more difficult to estimate since it depends in addition, on such measures as the fraction of branches terminating on two inaccessible nodes, the fraction of branches terminating on only one inaccessible node, etc. For these reasons we have made the following assumptions: the total number of network parameters n is 1.1 times the number of branches, the number of branches is 2.2 times the number of inaccessible nodes, 45% of the branches terminate on 2 inaccessible nodes, 55% of the branches terminate on exactly 1 inaccessible node. Using these assumptions, the computational complexity can be calculated in terms of the number of inaccessible nodes, q.

The basic steps required to compute the measurable y-parameter matrix \underline{y} are the same for both the direct and the efficient algorithms: (1) the new branch admittance matrix \underline{Y}_b^i is formed; (2) then the new nodal admittance matrix \underline{Y}_b^i is formed and inverted; (3) finally \underline{y} is computed.

[†] See equations (4) - (7).

Steps (1) and (3) are identical in both the efficient and the direct methods. Making use of the assumptions discussed above, step (1) requires about $0.05q^2$ complex multiplications, and step (3) requires about $13.31q^2$ complex multiplications for a total of about $13.36q^2$ complex multiplications for steps (1) and (3) combined.

Using the efficient algorithm to invert \underline{Y}_n^{\prime} discussed in Section 2.1, step (2) requires about $q^2+3.45q+4.21$ complex multiplications. Using the direct inversion of \underline{Y}_n^{\prime} , step (2) requires about $5q^3+0.61q$ complex multiplications.

The total number of complex multiplications necessary to find the measurable y-parameters \underline{y} after a single parameter is changed is therefore $14.36q^2 + 3.45q + 4.21$ using the efficient algorithm and $5q^3 + 13.36q^2 + 0.16q$ using the direct algorithm. The efficient algorithm is clearly very superior.

A Fibonacci search using 7 evaluations of y is performed for each parameter, and the number of parameters is assumed to be 1.1 times the number of branches or about 2.42q. Thus the number of complex multiplications required to search over all parameters is 16.94q times the values cited in the previous paragraph. These results are shown in Figure 4 as a function of the number of inaccessible nodes q.

We close this section with a discussion of the computational complexity of forming (20) and solving for the unknown parameters \underline{x} . Three steps are required:

- form the Jacobian matrix F, which has a column for each parameter and a row for every measurement;
- (2) form the product F. TF;
- (3) solve for x.




Figure 4 - The computational complexity of the parameter search.

Using the assumptions discussed previously, step (1) requires about $9.29q^3 + 26.14q^2$ real multiplications per parameter for a total of $22.48q^4 + 63.26q^3$ real multiplications. Step (2) requires about $2.93q^2$ m real multiplications, where m is the number of measurements. Assuming that m = 2n = 4.84q, then step (2) requires about $14.18q^3$ real multiplications. Finally step (3) requires about $4.72q^3 + 5.86q^2 - 0.81q$ real multiplications. Therefore the total number of complex multiplications (1 complex multiplication = 4 real multiplications) to form (20) and solve for \underline{x} is about $5.62q^4 + 20.54q^3 + 1.47q^2$. This is also plotted in Figure 4.

4.0 Conclusions

We have studied the problems of high resolution fault diagnosis in linear, analog electrical circuits in which a limited number of terminals are accessible for measurement. We have chosen to describe the faults in terms of short circuits between pairs of nodes and the values of parameters in the network model (resistances, capacitances, inductances, and controlled source gains). This approach is an outgrowth of our previous study [4], [5] in which the fault description was given only in terms of short circuits.

Specifically we have developed and tested an efficient algorithm for computing network responses (transfer functions at accessible terminals) after a single parameter is changed. The parameter change does not need to be small, and in fact the algorithm calculates <u>exactly</u> the new network responses, no matter how large the parameter change is. This algorithm was developed for use in a search over the network parameters for the network responses which best match the measured responses. The computational complexity (in terms of the number of complex multiplications) of this algorithm, which takes advantage of the special relationship between the network before and after a parameter is changed, was found to be very much better than the computational complexity of a direct algorithm. (See Figure 4).

In addition we studied the problem of choosing a set of measurements for fault analysis. We have found that the suitability of a set of measurements for resolving a fault can be expressed in terms of the Jacobian matrix \underline{F} of the network responses (the partial derivatives of the network responses with respect to the network parameters). The fault can be resolved to the network parameter level only if the number of measurements m is at least as great as the number of network parameters n and, in addition, the rank of \underline{F} is n. This latter condition can fail in the various ways illustrated in Section 2.2. The most promising way to find a set of independent measurements in practical cases appears to be to examine the numerical conditioning of the nxn matrix $\underline{F}^T\underline{F}$ over various combinations of measurements ($m \ge n$). We have written an efficient algorithm for forming the Jacobian matrix. Finding the "best-conditioned" nxn matrix $\underline{F}^T\underline{F}$ appears to be a time consuming process which seems best suited to a "simulation-before-test" process.

While investigating the measurement problem we discovered that it may be possible to accurately approximate the parameter set by solving a set of linear equations in which the coefficient matrix is $\underline{\mathsf{F}^T}\underline{\mathsf{F}}$. The computational complexity of forming and solving these equations increases as q^4 (q is the number of inaccessible nodes), whereas the computational complexity of an efficient search increases as q^3 . However, Figure 4 shows that one cycle of the linear approximation is less complex than one cycle of an efficient search (using a seven point Fibonacci search in each coordinate direction) for networks having fewer than 40 inaccessible nodes. Until testing is completed, however, it is impossible to judge how many cycles of the linear approximation are needed for a good solution, and problems of convergence are also possible.

5.0 Future Work

We have developed several efficient algorithms for computing network responses and partial derivatives, which can be put together in various ways

to solve for the parameter values and short circuits, if any exist. Work is currently in progress to evaluate the various ways these algorithms can be used in forming an automatic fault diagnosis tool for analog electrical circuits which has the best combination of efficiency and reliability. This process will require a considerable amount of testing, including the use of real measurements on real circuits.

Appendix 1

Computer Program Listings

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MARK 8.0 RA 11/23/78	THE COLUMN THE PARTY OF THE PAR	Y21P, COSTWW, JPA WROW, KCOL, WCB0), XROW(30), XC	C15), RMC15), XMUC15) ROWC65), GMRUMC15), S RNCOL(15), XMURDWC1 ACOL(15), YBROK(65), IA IALPHA, IYB, OM COL, RMRCH, RMCOL, XM	TATION OF TATIONS POLICE POLIC	PARA YHNOM YN(3,3) COMPUTE NODE-TO-BRAN	ETERS: YNNOM
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Appendix 2

Reprint of

"Efficient Fault Analysis in Linear Analog Circuits" by

A. T. Johnson, Jr.

Efficient Fault Analysis in Linear **Analog Circuits**

ALFRED T. JOHNSON, JR., MEMBER, 1888

Abstract-Fault analysis in analog networks is a form of network parameter identification. The problem of finding network parameters from measurements at the accessible terminals can be expressed as the solution of a system of nonlinear equations. Such a system of equations is usually solved by a multidimensional search. Every step of the search requires solving for the network responses in terms of the parameters, comparing the solution to the measured responses, and then adjusting the paremeters In such a way as to produce a response closer to the measured response. The computation time required for this analysis is often excessive in practical applications, and poses a major impediment to fault analysis in analog circuits. The representation of short and open circuits poses additional problems, depending upon how the network equations are formulated.

We have used nodal analysis, representing short circuits by a change in the network graph, and open circuits by a zero branch admirtance. A formula of Householder and sparse matrix techniques are used to efficiently compute the response of an electrical circuit with either a short circuit or other large parameter change. The number of complex multiplications and divisions to find the network response at the accessible terminals when the network has a single short circuit involving at least one inaccessible terminal is reduced by about a factor of 15 compared with direct methods.

I. INTRODUCTION

T is surprising perhaps that although the problem of I fault isolation in analog circuits has been studied longer than the comparable problem in digital circuits,1 the digital problem is much better understood, and automatic test equipment (ATE) for isolating faults in digital equipment to the chip and even to the gate level is available, but ATE available for isolating faults in analog circuits is much less sophisticated [13], [14]. The explanation of this phenominon lies partly with the fact that analog signals are inherently more complex than digital signals. They occur continuously in time, rather than at discrete times, and their values (in principle) have infinite resolution, instead of being truncated to a finite number of bits.

In the linear analog circuits discussed in this report, the problem of signal variety can be partly overcome by restricting observation to the sinusoidal steady state, since the system behavior to any input can be determined from a knowledge of the sinusoidal steady state response at all frequencies. Clearly all frequencies cannot be considered, and the problem of how to choose a set of frequencies has only begun to receive attention [9], [10]. In addition, the response at any frequency is related to the parameter values and the network graph by nonlinear equations, to which the only method of solution possible is a time consuming search.

In this paper we show how the search for single short circuits can be accomplished efficiently enough to make the computation practical. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of this method in identifying short circuit faults in analog circuits whose resistance, capacitance, inductance, and controlled source gains differ significantly from their nominal values.

II. FORMULATING THE Y-PARAMETERS AT THE ACCESSIBLE NODES

We will consider linear lumped-parameter networks having p + 1 accessible terminals, numbered 0-p, as shown in Fig. 1. The network of Fig. 1 contains n+1 nodes, including the reference node, and b branches and is assumed to contain no internal independent sources but may contain dependent sources. We will formulate the nodal equations using the standard branch shown in Fig.

The passive element in branch k, denoted by its admittance Y_{bk} , must be nonzero, but any of the sources may be zero or all may be present, if desired. In the equations that follow, v is the branch voltage vector, j is the branch current vector, e is the node voltage vector, e, is the independent voltage source vector, and j, is the independent current source vector, using the notation of Desoer and Kuh [1]. The dimension of each of these vectors is $b \times 1$, except e which is $n \times 1$. Considering the kth standard branch shown in Fig. 2, it is clear that the branch v-i constraints are given by

$$j = j_s + (G_m + Y - Y\mu)v + (\alpha - YR_m)j - Yv_s$$
 (1)

where $Y = \text{diag}(Y_k)$ is the branch passive admittance matrix, and G_m , μ , α , and R_m are the coupling matrices due to the controlled sources. The dimension of each of these matrices is $b \times b$. (The elements of matrices G_{-} and α are current sources, and the elements of matrices μ and R., are voltage sources controlled, respectively, by voltages and currents.) Following the convention of Desocr and Kuh, define the $n \times 1$ node-to-branch incidence

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'An extensive bibliography of both digital and analog fault isolation is given by Saeks and Liberty [12].




Fig. 1. Linear lumped-parameter network with p+1 accessible terminals.




Fig. 2. Standard branch k.

matrix A.

$$\{A\}_{ij} = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{if branch } j \text{ leaves node } i \\ -1, & \text{if branch } j \text{ enters node } i \\ 0, & \text{if branch } j \text{ is not incident on node } i \end{cases}$$

Solving (1) for j and using the Kirchhoff current law Aj=0 and the Kirchhoff voltage law $A^Te=v$, it can be shown that the network node equations are

$$AY_bA^Te=i (2)$$

where Y_b is the $b \times b$ branch admittance matrix given by

$$Y_b = (1 + YR_m - \alpha)^{-1} (Y - Y\mu + G_m)$$
 (3)

and i is the $n \times 1$ vector of independent source currents

$$i = A(1 + YR_{m} - \alpha)^{-1}(Y_{0}, -j_{0}). \tag{4}$$

Note that Ye, is a Norton transformation of the independent voltage sources. Because of the choice of standard branch shown in Fig. 2, the network can always be modeled with current sources only.

In both (3) and (4) it is necessary to invert the matrix $1 + YR_m - \alpha$ in order to formulate the node equations. Johnson and Pennington [2] have shown that if the network can be modeled so that the branch current j_k of a

branch which contains a current controlled source does not control any source, then the inverse of $1 + YR_m - \alpha$ is $1 - YR_m + \alpha$. Since most networks can be modeled this way, forming the node equations does not present any difficulty.

The accessible nodes have been numbered 0-p, and the inaccessible nodes have been numbered p+1 through n. Partition the rows of the node-to-branch incidence matrix A into accessible and inaccessible nodes

$$A = \left[\frac{A_1}{A_2} \right] \tag{5}$$

where A_1 is the $p \times n$ incidence matrix of accessible nodes, and A_2 is the $q \times n$ incidence matrix of inaccessible nodes, and q = n - p is the number of inaccessible nodes. Using (5) in (2) and partitioning i and e as follows:

$$i = \begin{bmatrix} i_1 \\ \vdots \\ i_2 \end{bmatrix} \qquad e = \begin{bmatrix} e_1 \\ \vdots \\ e_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

where i_1 and e_1 are $p \times 1$ vectors, and i_2 and e_2 are $q \times 1$ vectors, we obtain

$$\left[\frac{A_1 Y_b A_1^T}{A_2 Y_b A_1^T} \frac{A_1 Y_b A_2^T}{A_2 Y_b A_2^T} \left[\frac{e_1}{e_2} \right] = \left[\frac{i_1}{i_2} \right]. \tag{6}$$

Now eliminate e_2 from (6) and make use of the fact that $i_2 = 0$, since no independent sources are connected to inaccessible nodes, to obtain

$$i_1 = A_1 Y_b \left[1 - A_2^T (A_2 Y_b A_2^T)^{-1} A_2 Y_b \right] A_1^T e_1$$
 (7)

so that

$$y_i \triangleq A_1 Y_b \left[1 - A_2^T (A_2 Y_b A_2^T)^{-1} A_2 Y_b \right] A_1^T$$
 (8)

is the $p \times p$ matrix of measurable y-parameters defined at the ports having a common "ground" node (node 0 in Fig. 1). The subscript i indicates that the y-parameters are evaluated at frequency ω_i .

III. FAULT ANALYSIS

Let $\hat{y_i}$ be the matrix of measured y-parameters, where the measurement is made at frequency ω_i . A fault represented by a shift of the network element values from their nominal values could be identified by solving the nonlinear equation

$$\hat{y_i} = y_i(Y_b) \tag{9}$$

for the unknown parameter values. If a single frequency is used, as in (9), the number of network parameters usually exceeds the number of independent y-parameters, so that (9) has no unique solution. One approach, suggested by Ransom and Saeks [3], is to find the solution to (9) that minimizes a norm $\|Y_{b0} - Y_b\|$, where Y_{b0} is evaluated from the nominal network element values. Ransom and Saeks give an approximate solution to this problem using linear methods. The difficulty with this approach is that the solution assumes, roughly speaking, that the most likely state of the element values in the network is the one which

causes the smallest drift from the nominal values consistent with the measurements. This assumption excludes the possibility of catastrophic faults (open and short circuits).

Another approach is to augment (9) by measurements at a sufficient number of frequencies that a unique solution exists. The relationship between fault resolution and the number of frequencies and measurements is discussed by Sen and Saeks [9], [10]. Although their algorithm requires choosing a number of frequencies, it is not clear how this is done. Thus we might define:

$$\hat{\mathbf{y}} = (\hat{y}_1 \, \hat{y}_2 \cdots \hat{y}_k)^T$$

$$\mathbf{y} = (y_1 \, y_2 \cdots y_k)^T \tag{10}$$

and solve the equation

$$\hat{\mathbf{y}} = \mathbf{y}(Y_b). \tag{11}$$

Nonlinear equations, such as (11), are often solved by defining a norm $c = ||\hat{y} - y||$, and then making a multidimensional search for min c. The amount of computation required by such a search could be prohibitive. Chen and Saeks [4] show that if only one parameter is changed at a time, the measurable system function can be evaluated without the need to invert a matrix, which is apparently necessary in (8). Their method, is based on a formula given by Householder [5].

In this paper we show how the Householder formula can be used to efficiently analyze networks containing short circuits by considering the change in the network graph. The measurable effects of open circuits and finite parameter changes can be analyzed by considering changes in Y_b , and although this is essentially equivalent to the method described by Chen and Saeks, it is given here in the context of nodal analysis so that all parameter changes can be analyzed with one formulation of the network equations.

A. Short Circuits

If two nodes of a network become shorted, the new node-to-branch incidence matrix A' is related to the original incidence matrix in a very simple way. If nodes i and j are shorted, then A' is formed by replacing row i by the sums of rows i and j, and then deleting row j. If node i is the ground node, then A' is formed by deleting row j. These row transformations can be obtained by premultiplying A by a matrix R, each element of which is either 0 or 1. Fig. 3 illustrates the row transformation matrix describing two different short circuits (one involving the ground node and the other not involving the ground node) in a network with 5 nodes and 7 branches. The incidence matrices are partitioned by the dashed lines under the assumption that nodes 3 and 4 in the original network are inaccessible. Thus the top half of the A matrix is A_1 , and the bottom half is A_2 . A similar partition is shown for $A' = (A'_1 \mid A'_2)^T$, but in the transformed network some of the formerly inaccessible nodes may have been made accessible (by virtue of their having been shorted to an accessible node).




Fig. 3. Effect of short circuits on node-to-branch incidence matrix, A.
(a) Original network graph. (b) Short circuit between nodes 2 and 3.
(c) Short circuit between nodes 2 and ground or 0.

where $R = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$

The R matrix is the "after-to-before" node transformation matrix, which has a column for every original node in the network and a row for every node after the fault. (Since node 0 does not enter into A, it does not appear in R either.) Thus R may be partitioned by columns and rows into the accessible and inaccessible nodes before (columns) and after (rows) the fault, as shown in Fig. 3.

Denote the partitioning of R by

$$R \triangleq \begin{bmatrix} R_{11} & R_{12} \\ 0 & R_{22} \end{bmatrix} \tag{12}$$

where the lower, left partition in (12) is 0 since the faulted network cannot have any inaccessible nodes which were accessible in the unfaulted network. In other words, if a short circuit occurs between an accessible and an inaccessible node, the combined node becomes accessible. Thus

$$A' = RA = \begin{bmatrix} R_{11}A_1 + R_{12}A_2 \\ -R_{22}A_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

and, therefore,

$$A'_{1} = R_{11}A_{1} + R_{12}A_{2}$$

$$A'_{2} = R_{22}A_{2}.$$
(13)

B. Forming the y-Parameters of the Shorted Network

The y-parameters of networks containing a short circuit can be computed from (8) after replacing A_1 by A'_1 and A_2 by A'_2 . Define $Y_2 \triangleq A_2 Y_b A_2^T$, which is the $q \times q$ nodal admittance matrix of inaccessible nodes. In the analysis that follows, we assume that Y_2 is known. (In fact Y_2^{-1} must be computed only once for any circuit using the nominal element values, so the cost of its computation is a negligible part of the total cost of analysis.)

If the short circuit occurs between two accessible nodes, then $A'_2 = A_2$, and the new y-parameters are found from (8) with no matrix inversion. In fact, if a short circuit exists between two accessible nodes, it can be easily observed by making resistance measurements between all pairs of accessible nodes, so the method described here is not needed.

If the short circuit involves any inaccessible node, then $A'_2 \neq A_2$ and the inverse of $Y'_2 = A'_2 Y_b A'_2$ must be computed. The main contribution of this paper is to show that the inverse of Y'_2 may be found in terms of Y_2 with about one fifteenth as many multiplications as are required to find the inverse of a general $q \times q$ matrix. This saving, described in detail in the next section, is due to the fact that Y'_2 is closely related to Y_2 , whose inverse is kown. An additional saving of computation and memory is realized by the use of sparse matrix techniques, which are discussed in Section IV.

C. Finding the Inverse of Y' Efficiently

From the definitions of A'_2 , R_{22} , Y_2 , and Y'_2 it is easy to show that

$$Y_2' = R_{22} Y_2 R_{22}^T. (14)$$

Let us add a row to R₂₂ as follows

$$S \triangleq \left[\frac{R_{22}}{\mu^T} \right] \tag{15}$$

where u^T is a row unit vector containing all zeros except for a 1 in the right-most column representing a shorted node. (At most two columns of R_{22} are involved in the short circuit. If only one is involved, then that column of u^T is unity. If two columns of R_{22} are involved, then only the right-most one is unity. This convention could be reversed by changing the definition of R.) We now decompose S into U and P,

$$S = U + P \tag{16}$$

where P is formed as follows. If the short circuit is

between an accessible and an inaccessible node, then P=6. If the short circuit is between two inaccessible nodes, then $\{P\}_{i=p,j=p}$ is unity, and the remaining elements are zero. (In this case, the unit element in P is element $\{R\}_{ij}$, where nodes i and j are shorted, and i < j due to our numbering convention.) With these definitions, it is easy to see that U is orthogonal, since its columns are independent unit vectors and thus form an orthonormal set [7]. Consequently $U^{-1} = U^T$, and if the short circuit is between an accessible and an inaccessible node, then $S^{-1} = S^T$. If the short circuit is between two inaccessible nodes, then S^{-1} is only slightly more difficult to compute, as we will show. Now define $C \triangleq SY_2S^T$, and, therefore,

$$C = \left[\frac{R_{22}}{u^T} \right] Y_2 \left[R_{22}^T \mid u \right] = \left[\frac{Y_2'}{u^T Y_2 R_{22}^T} \mid \frac{R_{22} Y_2 u}{u^T Y_2 u} \right]$$

and

$$C^{-1} = (S^T)^{-1} Y_2^{-1} S^{-1} \triangleq \left[\frac{K \mid L}{M \mid N} \right]. \tag{17}$$

Faddeeva [8] shows that $K = Y_2^{r-1}[1 - (R_{22}Y_2u)M]$, and, therefore,

$$Y_2^{\prime - 1} = K [1 - (R_{22}Y_2u)M]^{-1}.$$
 (18)

The inverse on the right side of (18) can be computed efficiently using a formula given by Householder [5], [6], which states that if $A = B - vw^T$, where v and w are column vectors, then

$$A^{-1} = B^{-1} + \frac{B^{-1} c_W^T B^{-1}}{1 - w^T B^{-1} c}$$
 (19)

where the division on the right side of (19) is by a scalar. Thus the inverse of Y_2' is

$$Y_2^{\prime-1} = K \left[1 + \frac{(R_{22}Y_2u)M}{1 - M(R_{22}Y_2u)} \right]. \tag{20}$$

In order to use (20), K and M must be found from (17). We have mentioned that if the short circuit is between an accessible node and an inaccessible node, then $S^{-1} = S^T$. In fact, if the short circuit is between an accessible node and node n, then S = I, and K and M are simply partitions of (17). If the short circuit is between two inaccessible nodes, we have shown that S = U + P, where $U^{-1} = U^T$, and the rank of P is unity. Thus P can be written in the form vw^T , and (19) can be used to find S^{-1} . Proceeding in this manner it can be shown that $S^{-1} = U^T + Q$, where

$$Q_{rs} = \begin{cases} -1, & \text{if } r = i - p, \ s = n - p \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

And so, even in the most complex case, K and M can be evaluated without a matrix inversion. Some time can be saved in computing the triple matrix product in (17) by noting that L and N (each column vectors) are not needed, so the last column of C^{-1} need not be evaluated. Using straightforward matrix multiplication to find K and

M from (17) and then Y_2^{r-1} from (20) requires $q^2(q^4-2q^3+3q^2-q+1)$ complex multiplications, where q is the number of accessible nodes in the network.

This method of computing Y_2^{r-1} is unnecessarily inefficient since many of the matrices in (17) and (20) are sparse, and others (S and R_{22}), in addition, are special since their nonzero elements are either +1 or -1. In Secton IV-A we show how to reduce the number of complex multiplications required to evaluate Y_2^{r-1} to $\beta q^2(q-1)$, where β is typically about 0.3 and is always a positive number less than unity.

Once Y_2^{r-1} is known, the y-parameters at the accessible nodes are found from (8). Evaluating the matrix products in (8) in a straightforward manner requires $2b^3 + (2p + q - q)$ $1)b^2+(q-1)^2b$ multiplications, where b is the number of branches in the network, p is the number of accessible nodes not counting the reference node, and q is the number of inaccessible nodes. Using the sparse matrix techniques described in Section IV-A, the number of multiplications needed to evaluate y_i from Y_2^{i-1} can be reduced to $2(1+\gamma)b^2$, where γ is typically about 0.1. For example, a network with 20 branches, 3 accessible nodes (plus the accessible reference node), and 8 inaccessible nodes requires 14180 multiplications to evaluate y, directly from (8). By using sparse matrix techniques, this is reduced to 880 multiplications, a saving of a factor of 16 in this case. The straightforward evaluation in general requires nearly b times as many multiplications as the more efficient approach using sparse matrix techniques, so the saving increases with network complexity.

D. Open Circuits and Other Large Parameter Changes

For completeness, we include a discussion of open circuits and other large parameter changes, although this has been discussed elsewhere [4]. The main purpose in this section is to show how the analysis can be carried out in the context of nodal analysis.

Parameter changes are accounted for in (8) by a change in the $b \times b$ branch admittance matrix Y_b . In order to evaluate the new y-parameters from (8), the inverse of the inaccessible nodal admittance matrix $Y_2 = A_2 Y_b A_2^T$ must be found. If a single parameter in the network is changed, then the new branch admittance matrix is $Y_b \triangleq Y_b + \Delta$, where Δ has only one nonzero element representing the change in one parameter. Suppose a change occurs in element ij. Then Δ can be written duv^T , where d is a scalar equal to the parameter change, u is a unit vector in direction i, and v is a unit vector in direction j. Now define $U \triangleq A_2 u$ and $V \triangleq A_2 v$, so that $Y_2' = Y_2 + dUV^T$. Householder shows that the inverse of Y_2' can be found from

$$Y_2^{\prime-1} = Y_2^{-1} \left[1 - U (d^{-1} + V^T Y_2^{-1} U)^{-1} V^T Y_2^{-1} \right]. \tag{21}$$

The inverse of Y_2 is known, and $d^{-1} + V^T Y_2^{-1} U$ is a scalar, so (21) can be evaluated without a matrix inversion.

IV. SPARSE MATRIX TECHNIQUES

Sparse matrices arise in both the evaluation of the inverse if Y_2 and in the evaluation of the accessible y-parameter matrix y_i . These are discussed separately in Sections IV-A and IV-B.

A. Evaluating the Inverse of Y'2

We have shown that the inverse of Y'_2 may be found from (20), which is repeated below for convenience:

$$Y_2^{\prime-1} = K[1 + (R_{22}Y_2u)M/(1 - M(R_{22}Y_2u))]$$

where K and M are defined by

$$\begin{bmatrix} K & L \\ M & N \end{bmatrix} = (S^T)^{-1} Y_2^{-1} S^{-1}.$$
 (22)

The dimensions of K and M are, respectively, $(q-1) \times (q-1)$ and $1 \times (q-1)$.

In (22) Y_2^{-1} is known, and S is defined by

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} R_{22} \\ u^T \end{bmatrix}. \tag{23}$$

 R_{22} is the matrix which transforms A_2 , the (inaccessible node)-to-branch incidence matrix before the fault, into A'_2 , the (inaccessible node)-to-branch incidence matrix after the fault, so that

$$A_2' = R_{22}A_2.$$
 (24)

In the discussion that follows, the reader may find it helpful to refer to the illustration of Fig. 3. Suppose nodes i and j are shorted, where j > i. Then rows 1 through i-1of R_{22} contain zeros except that the diagonal element is unity. This indicates that nodes 1 through i-1 in the faulted network are identical to nodes 1 through i-1 in the unfaulted network. Row i of R22 contains all zeros except for unity elements in columns i and j, indicating that node i in the faulted network is formed by combining nodes i and j in the unfaulted network. Finally, the remaining rows of R22 contain all zeros, except that the first row to the right of the diagonal is unity. This indicates that the remaining nodes of the faulted network are identical to the remaining nodes of the unfaulted network. The faulted network contains one less node than the unfaulted network, so the dimension of R_{22} is $(q-1)\times q$, where, as usual, q is the number of inaccessible nodes.

We have chosen to number the nodes consecutively, beginning with the accessible nodes. We have also avoided analyzing networks with a short circuit between two accessible nodes, since such a fault may be found from driving point impedance measurements between all pairs of accessible nodes. Thus node j is always inaccessible, but node i may be either accessible or inaccessible. In the description above we have assumed that node i is inaccessible. If it is accessible, then R_{22} is simpler than described above, since all rows contain a single unit element. (The unit element is on the diagonal in rows 1 through j-1 and in the first column to the right of the diagonal in all other rows. This indicates that all inaccessible nodes in the faulted network correspond to an inaccessible nodes

	-	-
4	м	n

1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0)
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
0		0	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0)

(a)

. . .

-	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0)
	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0 0
1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0 1 0

(b)

Fig. 4. S matrices for a network with 8 accessible nodes. (a) Short circuit between nodes 4 and 6. (b) Short circuit between nodes 6 and any accessible node.

sible node in the unfaulted network, but one inaccessible node in the unfaulted network is now accessible, and so it has no row in R_{22} .)

In (23) u^T is a row vector containing all zeros except that column j is unity.

To illustrate the formation of the S matrix, consider a network with 8 inaccessible nodes. (For convenience in this discussion they are numbered 1-8, instead of p+1 through p+8.) Fig. 4(a) shows the S matrix for a short circuit between nodes 4 and 6, and Fig. 4(b) shows the S matrix for a short circuit between node 6 and any accessible node. The formation of the inverse of the S matrix is given by $S^{-1} = U^T + Q$, where

$$[Q]_n = \begin{cases} -1, & \text{if } r = i - p, \ s = n - p \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

as explained in Section III-C, where S = U + P, and all elements of P are zero except if the shorted nodes i and j are both inaccessible, in which case $[P]_{ij}$ is unity. The unity element of P is circled in Fig. 4(a). In this illustration we have taken p = 0 for convenience, where p is the number of accessible nodes. Also note that n - p = q. The inverse of the S matrix can be formed by inspection, and in particular, Fig. 5 shows the inverses of the matrices of Fig. 4.

We now turn to the problem of evaluating K and M. The right side of (22) may be written

$$(U+Q^{T})Y_{2}^{-1}(U^{T}+Q) = UY_{2}^{-1}U^{T}+UY_{2}^{-1}Q + Q^{T}Y_{2}^{-1}U^{T}+Q^{T}Y_{2}^{-1}Q.$$
(25)

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(a)

(b

Fig. 5. (a) Inverse of the matrix of Fig. 4(a). (b) Inverse of the matrix of Fig. 4(b).

Recall that the right-most column (column q) of (25) is not needed. The second and fourth terms on the right side of (25) are zero except for the right-most column, so they need not be evaluated.

To evaluate $UY_2^{-1}U^T$, define the row vector $V^T \triangleq [v_k]$, where $v_k = (\text{unit column of row } k \text{ in } U), k = 1, 2, \dots, q - 1$. Thus

$$[K]_{mn} = [UY_2^{-1}U^T]_{mn} = [Y_2^{-1}]_{c_m, c_n}, \qquad m = 1, 2, \dots, q-1$$

$$(26)$$

Finally M is the $1 \times (q-1)$ row vector whose elements are the first q-1 columns of the last row (row q) of the sum of terms one and three of (25). Thus

$$[M]_{n} = [UY_{2}^{-1}U^{T}]_{q,n} + [Q^{T}Y_{2}^{-1}U^{T}]_{q,n}$$

$$= [Y_{2}^{-1}]_{j,e_{n}} - [Y_{2}^{-1}]_{j,e_{n}}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots, q - 1.$$

K and M are evaluated from (26) and (27) with no multiplications, and the evaluation of K, the larger of the two, requires no additions.

Now that K and M are known, Y_2^{r-1} can be found from (21). In evaluating (21) it is useful to first find the (q-1) $\times 1$ column vector $\mathbf{x} \triangleq R_{22}Y_2\mathbf{u}$. Recall that \mathbf{u} is a vector with all zero elements except that row \mathbf{j} is unity. Thus \mathbf{x} is the \mathbf{j} th column of $R_{22}Y_2$. R_{22} is the partition of S formed from the first q-1 rows (23). We may make use of the

row vector V^T to form x as follows:

$$[x]_{n} = [R_{22}Y_{2}u]_{n} = \begin{cases} [Y_{2}]_{v_{n},i}, & \text{if node } i \text{ is accessible} \\ [Y_{2}]_{v_{n},i}, & v_{n} \neq i \\ [Y_{2}]_{v_{n},i} + [Y_{2}]_{j,i}, & v_{n} = i \end{cases},$$

$$if node } i \text{ is inaccessible}$$

$$n = 1, 2, \dots, q-1, \quad (28)$$

Using the definition of x in (28), (21) may be written

$$Y_2^{\prime - 1} = K + K[xM/(1 - Mx)] \tag{29}$$

which requires evaluating three matrix products, two of which directly involve x. From (28) it is clear that x is formed by reordering the elements of column j of Y_2 . Since only a few inaccessible nodes are normally coupled to node j, x is usually sparse. Define β equal to the fraction of nonzero elements of column j of Y_2 . The number of multiplications required to compute Mx is $\beta q < q$. β is usually significantly less than one, and so it is worth designing the algorithm to avoid the multiplications by zero. Similarly, βq rows of xM are zero, and it is worth forming only the nonzero rows. Thus (29) can be evaluated with $\beta q^2(q-1)$ multiplications and divisions. Note that the multiplications in (29) are the only multiplications required to evaluate Y_2^{r-1} , since K and M have been formed in (26) and (27) without multiplications.

B. Evaluating the y-Parameters

In this section we discuss the evaluation of the y-parameter matrix y_i given by (8). In the faulted network, the node-to-branch incidence matrices are A'_1 and A'_2 , so that (8) becomes

$$y_i = A_1' Y_b \left[1 - A_2'^T Y_2'^{-1} A_2' Y_b \right] A_1'^T. \tag{30}$$

Two forms appear in (30) which must be discussed separately: A^TYA and AYA^T .

The most convenient way to store the node-to-branch incidence matrices, which we will refer to generally by A in the discussion which follows, is by two column vectors A^+ and A^- , defined as follows. If the kth column of A has a +1 element, then $[A^+]_k \triangleq (\text{row number of the } +1$ element of the kth column of A), otherwise $[A^+]_k \triangleq 0$. Similarly, if the kth column of A has a -1 element, then $[A^-]_k \triangleq (\text{row number of the } -1$ element of the kth column of A), otherwise $[A^-]_k = 0$. The formation of A^+ and A^- corresponding to a given node-to-branch incidence matrix A is illustrated in Fig. 6. Note that in practice it is necessary to store only the vectors A^+ and A^- and not the matrix A.

Now consider the evaluation of $X = A^T Y A$. Element $[X]_{m-1}$ is given by

$$[X]_{m,n} = \sum_{k} [A^{T}]_{m,k} \sum_{l} [Y]_{k,l} [A]_{l,n}$$

$$= \sum_{k,1} [A]_{k,m} [A]_{1,n} [Y]_{k,1}$$

$$= [Y]_{[A^{+}]_{m}[A^{+}]_{n}} + [Y]_{[A^{-}]_{m}[A^{+}]_{n}}$$

$$= [Y]_{[A^{+}]_{m}[A^{-}]_{n}} - [Y]_{[A^{-}]_{m}[A^{+}]_{n}}.$$
(31)

$$A^{+} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 0 \\ 5 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$A^{-} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 2 \\ 5 \\ 4 \\ 4 \\ 0 \\ 5 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Fig. 6. Node-to-branch incidence matrix A, and the corresponding compact equivalent vectors A^+ and A^- .


If any of the subscripts of [Y] in the last expression is zero, the term is zero.

The evaluation of $X' = AYA^T$ is somewhat different because the summation is along the rows of A instead of down the columns. In particular, element $[X']_{m,n}$ is given by

$$[X']_{m,n} = \sum_{k} [A]_{m,k} \sum_{l} [Y]_{k,l} [A^{T}]_{l,n}$$
$$= \sum_{k,l} [A]_{m,k} [A]_{n,l} [Y]_{k,l}$$
(32)

The right side of (32) cannot be evaluated by choosing m and n as in (31). Instead k and l are chosen and, for each choice, $[Y]_{k,l}$ is added to elements $[X']_{(A^+)_k,[A^+]_l}$ and $[X']_{(A^-)_k,[A^-]_l}$ and subtracted from elements $[X']_{(A^+)_k,[A^-]_l}$ and $[X']_{(A^-)_k,[A^+]_l}$. If any of the subscripts of [X'] is zero, that term is zero.

Products of the forms $X' = AYA^T$ and $X = A^TYA$ both appear in (30), and we have shown how to evaluate them without multiplication. An additional product of the form $X' \cdot Y_b$ must be evaluated, where Y_b is given by (3). Y_b is typically very sparse, so in the software we have chosen to store it as three vectors: one containing the nonzero elements of Y_b , and the other two containing, respectively, the row and column of that element. The saving in storage can be appreciated by recognizing that Y_b is a $b \times b$ matrix, where b is the number of branches in the network. The elements of Y_b which are not zero are the b diagonal elements plus one additional element for each controlled source. If the number of controlled sources is b/10, then






Fig. 7. Efficient formation of the matrix product X'-YA.

the sparse storage of Y_b requires storing 1.1b complex numbers and 2.2b integers, compared with the b^2 complex numbers required for conventional storage. If the software is written to accommodate networks with 100 branches, then conventional storage requires setting aside room for 10^4 complex numbers, compared to about 120 complex numbers and 240 integers required by compact storage.

Considerable computation time is also saved by storing Y_b sparsely. The matrix product $X' \cdot Y_b$ in (30) would require b^3 complex multiplications if performed directly, since the dimensions of both X' and Y_b are $b \times b$. The algorithm of Fig. 7 forms the product in $(1+\gamma)b^2$ complex multiplications, where γ is the fraction of the b branches containing a controlled source. Typically γ is about 0.1. In Fig. 7, $YB(\cdot)$ is a vector containing the IYB nonzero elements of Y_b , and $YBROW(\cdot)$ and $YBCOL(\cdot)$ are integer vectors containing the row and column numbers of each element of $YB(\cdot)$. The product $X' \cdot Y_b$ is called $D(\cdot, \cdot)$. $D(\cdot, \cdot)$ is not sparse, so it is stored conventionally.

Examination of (30) reveals another matrix product of the form $Y_b \cdot Z$, where in this case $Z = 1 + A_2^T Y_2^{r-1} A_2^r Y_b$. This matrix product is formed in a similar manner to $X'Y_b$ in $(1+\gamma)b^2$ complex multiplications. Thus altogether $2(1+\gamma)b^2$ complex multiplications are required to formulate y_i . A direct evaluation of (30) requires $2b^3 + (q-1+p)b^2 + ((q-1)^2 + p^2)b$ multiplications. Taking p=2, b=20, q=11 we find that y_i requires 22880 multiplications by direct methods, but only 880 multiplications by the methods described in this section with $\gamma=0.1$, a saving of a factor of 26 in this example.

Before closing this section it should be noted that the y-parameters of the unfaulted network are evaluated before evaluating the y-parameters of any faulted networks.

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This is done by applying (30) with A'_1 replaced by A_1 , A'_2 replaced by A_2 , and Y'_2^{-1} replaced by Y_2^{-1} . The inverse of Y_2 must be computed by conventional methods, but the methods of this section may be used for the remaining computation.

C. Summary of Efficient Computation

The y-parameters at the accessible ports of the faulted network are found from (30), where in the context of this report the faulted network is formed from the unfaulted network by shorting a single pair of nodes.

In Section IV-A we showed how to form the inverse of the $(q-1)\times(q-1)$ matrix Y_2' with only $\beta q^2(q-1)$ complex multiplications, where β is the fraction of nonzero elements in Y_2 . (Recall that $Y_2 = A_2 Y_b A_2^T$ is the inaccessible nodal admittance matrix.) Inversion of a $(q-1)\times(q-1)$ matrix requires about $5(q-1)^3$ complex multiplications using Wilf's rank annihilation method² [11], which is an efficient application of the Householder formula (19) [5]-[7].

In Section IV-B we showed that (30) can be evaluated in $2(1+\gamma)b^2$ complex multiplications. This result applies, whether or not the efficient evaluation of the inverse of Y_2' of Section IV-A is used. Thus the total number of complex multiplications required to evaluate the y-parameters at the accessible ports of the network with one pair of shorted terminals is $2(1+\gamma)b^2+q^2(q-1)$. If the inverse of Y_2' is found by conventional methods but the sparse matrix techniques of Section IV-B are used to form y_0 , then $2(1+\gamma)b^2+5(q-1)^3$ complex multiplications are required.

The y-parameters resulting from all possible single short circuits involving at least one inaccessible node must be evaluated. If the network contains p accessible terminals and q inaccessible terminals, then it can be shown that N = q(p+q) - q(q-1)/2 distinct pairs of shorted terminals can be identified. The total number of complex multiplications is, therefore, $N[2(1+\gamma)b^2 + \beta q^2(q-1)]$ using the efficient method in inverting Y_2' and N[2(1 + γ) $b^2 + 5(q-1)^3$] using a conventional inversion method. To show the benefit of the efficient matrix inversion, let us assume that the number of accessible ports p is 2, the number of branches b is twice the number of nodes, p+q+1, the fraction γ of branches having controlled sources is 0.1, and the fraction β of nonzero elements of Y_2' is 0.3. Using these assumptions, the total number of complex multiplications necessary to analyze all the inaccessible short circuits using both the efficient and the conventional methods of inverting Y_2 are shown in Fig. 8. The advantage of the efficient method is especially noticable for the larger networks.

V. EXAMPLE

We have described an efficient way of computing the y-parameters at the accessible terminals of a network with

²An error appears in our edition of Ralston and Wilf [11]. In the flow chart on p. 75, step 11 should be $1 \rightarrow i$, not $2 \rightarrow i$.




Fig. 8. Number of complex multiplications required to analyze all inaccessible short circuits in a network with q inaccessible nodes.

an internal short circuit. The question remains how useful this is in locating short-circuit faults, since the network parameters (resistance, capacitance, inductance, and controlled source gains) of the faulted network will be different from their nominal values. One possible way to locate the fault is to simulate all single short circuits (involving at least one inaccessible terminal) using the nominal parameters and the algorithm described in this paper, compare each of the simulated y-parameters to the measured y-parameters, and choose the closest set to locate the short circuit. Next a search over the parameter values could be conducted, as described by Chen and Saeks [4] or in Section III-D.

To date the short circuit algorithm has been tested using the network of Fig. 9. Measured data for the nine complex y-parameters at the three accessible ports (nodes 1-0, 2-0, and 3-0) were obtained by simulating single short circuits and setting the network parameters between 10 and 20 percent above or below nominal. It was expected that this might completely mask the effect of some short circuits. The cost function used to compare the "measured" and simulated y-parameters was

$$c = \sum_{i,j} \frac{|y_{ij} - \hat{y}_{ij}|}{|\hat{y}_{ij}|}$$

where y_{ij} is the y-parameter simulated from the fault model and \hat{y}_{ij} is the "measured" y-parameter.

Table I shows the actual fault, the fault determined by the minimum cost function, and the value of the cost function of the correct fault. Of the seven examples at 1000 Hz, the algorithm correctly located five pairs of




Fig. 9. Feedback amplifier.

TABLE I SUMMARY OF TEST RESULTS I

FREQUENCY,	ACTUAL SHORTED NODES	OF MINIMUM COST FUNCTION	HINIMUM COST FUNCTION VALUE	COST FUNCTION VALUE OF CORRECT FAULT
1000	0-8	0-8	1.087	1.087
	0-5	0-5	1.115	1.115
	0-10	0-10	1.290	1,290
	6-7	5-8	1.271	1.34
	3-5	3-8	1.122	1.20
	3-9	3-9	2.828	2.828
	7-8	7-8	1.632	1.632

shorted nodes. The two errors seemed to be caused by the fact that the magnitude of the capacitor impedances at 1000 Hz were much lower than the impedance levels of the network resistances. (The magnitude of the impedance of a 10-μF capacitor at 1000 Hz is 15.9 Ω.) It was expected that the short circuit between nodes 6 and 7 would be difficult it identify, since the 50-µF bypass capacitor is only about 3 \Omega at 1000 Hz, and so the changes in the parameters of the measured circuit could be expected to mask the short circuit. In fact, one of the reasons for this test was to determine how much the network parameters could be changed before this change prevented reliable identification of the short circuit. In this example, variations of the parameters of 10-20 percent from nominal still permitted correct identification of 5 out of 7 short circuits, or 71 percent of the cases tried. If the parameters of the "measured" network were set to the nominal values, then correct identification would occur, of course, in 100 percent of the cases, since then no error would exist between the "measured" and simulated y-parameters.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

We have shown an efficient way to analyze networks containing a single short circuit or other larger parameter change. The efficiency results from the fact that the network change caused by either the short circuit or other large parameter change results in an alteration of the inaccessible nodal admittance matrix by a matrix of unit rank. The response of the faulted network can therefore be computed in terms of the nominal response with many fewer multiplications than are required for and original analysis. Sparse matrix techniques were also used to reduce execution time.

The efficiency of the algorithm makes it practical to exhaustively search all possible single short circuits involving an inaccessible node in order to find a solution to the problem of locating a short circuit in an analog network from measurements at the accessible terminals. The test examples described in Section V show that short circuits can be reliably located by the algorithm, even though measurements were made at only one frequency and differences between the actual and the nominal parameter values were not taken into account. We expect that the reliability can be improved by making measurements at more than one frequency and by solving for the parameter values.

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